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Korea’s Patterns of Trade
Jean Imbs and Laurent L. Pauwels
Imbs and Pauwels (2020) introduce a measure of openness based 
on indirect trade. This paper illustrates the differences in the Korean 
patterns of trade when openness is measured using conventional 
measures based on direct trade, and when it is measured using 
this measure of indirect trade, labeled Export Intensity (EI). 
According to EI, the Republic of Korea (Korea) has been following 
an upward trend in openness since 2000 and even after 2010. 
This stands in contrast with most other large trading countries, 
including China and Germany. We show this is a reflection of 
Korea’s integration with a few partner economies, most notably 
China. Vertical integration is considerable between Korea and 
China, in manufacturing and in services alike. The extent of this 
integration would be invisible on the basis of conventional measures 
of openness.
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I. Introduction
Imbs and Pauwels (2020) introduce a measure of openness based on 
high order linkages. This paper applies this measure to characterize 
Korea’s patterns of trade. For a given activity, the measure, labeled 
Export Intensity (EI) computes the fraction of the downstream uses of 
gross output that cross the border. It captures the exposure of a given 
activity to foreign shocks that travel via the global value chain.1 This 
paper describes the patterns of Korean international trade as implied by 
EI over time, across sectors, and across trade partners. We document 
that Korea is a trade champion to an extent that is best captured by EI, 
rather than conventional measures. We show that Korea is exceptionally 
well integrated in global value chains. These value chains mostly involve 
China, unsurprisingly, but involve most of Korea’s sectors. As expected, 
they are relevant to manufacturing sectors, but also to most services 
like wholesale, retail, and some business services.
Conventional measures of trade are typically focused on direct 
trade. For example, direct exports (or imports) are often normalized by 
economic activity to evaluate a country or a sector’s openness.2 Imbs 
and Pauwels (2020) introduce a measure of indirect trade building from 
the decomposition of gross output in each sector into its downstream 
uses. Because of global value chains, an increasing number of activities 
are not traded directly, but are still exposed to foreign developments via 
their downstream customers. A relevant measure of openness ought to 
account for the diffusion of shocks with a foreign origin via the value 
chain, rather than via direct trade. There are other measures of trade 
focused on indirect trade, most famously Trade in Value Added (TiVA).3 
A detailed discussion of the differences between EI and TiVA can be 
found in Imbs and Pauwels (2020). A key point is that TiVA decomposes 
exports, whereas EI decomposes gross output. TiVA still incorporates 
direct trade, which makes it unapplicable to sectors that trade very 
little or not at all, like services. TiVA can take infinite values for some 
1 See Imbs and Pauwels (2020) for a discussion of the differences between 
EI and Trade in Value Added (TiVA), the measure introduced by Johnson and 
Noguera (2012).
2 See for instance Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) or Head and Mayer (2004)
3 See for instance Johnson and Noguera (2012), Johnson (2014), Koopman, 
Wang, and Wei (2014), Bems and Kikkawa (2019), or Bems and Johnson (2017)
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sectors in some countries, and this tends to happen precisely for those 
activities that trade very little directly. In short, TiVA was not designed 
to measure exposure to foreign shocks. EI fills this gap.
EI is computed on the basis of global input-output linkages as 
reported by the World Input-Output Tables.4 By definition gross output 
in a sector must equal all of its intermediate and final uses downstream: 
For each sector gross output is either sold as an intermediate input at 
home or abroad, or sold as a final good at home or abroad. For a given 
sector, we separate all uses into purely domestic uses and all others. 
“All others” incorporates downstream uses that cross a border at one 
time or more, i.e. global value chains. We then compute the fraction of a 
given value chain that does cross the border at least once. This is done 
with a manipulation of the Leontief inverse of the world input-output 
matrix, which is described in detail in Imbs and Pauwels (2020), and 
summarized in Section II.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes 
briefly the computations involved in computing EI and its predecessors. 
Section III presents our results, in three steps. First we illustrate the 
differences between Korea’s aggregate openness over time as implied 
by different measures. Second we discuss the sector breakdown of 
openness. Third we discuss the differences in the breakdown of Korea’s 
main trade partners, and the relevant corresponding sectors. Section IV 
concludes.
II. Measuring Indirect Trade
A. Export Intensity




r. The computations build from the identity that gross output 








1 1 1= = =
= ∑ ∑ + ∑  (1)
where Y ri is the value of gross output in sector r = 1,...,R of country i = 
4 For details about WIOT, see (Dietzenbacher et al. 2013).
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1,...,I, Zri
s
j is the value of intermediate uses of this good in country j and 
sector s, and F ri j is the value of its final uses in country j. Throughout 
the paper, subscripts denote countries and superscripts denote sectors. 
Both indexes are ordered so that the first identifies the location of 
production, and the second identifies the location of use.
Imbs and Pauwels (2020) introduce a decomposition of the identity 
according to border crossings, isolating a component focused on 
domestic uses only:
 
S J J S
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 (2)
The second term focuses on domestic uses. Adapting this decomposition 
to the measure of Upstreamness introduced by Antràs and Chor (2013) 
and Antràs and Chor (2018) with ari
s
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 is the typical element of the Hadamard division
 [(I − A)−2 F − (I − ADOM)−2 FDOM] Ø [(I − A)−2 F] 
where ari
s
j  is the typical element of A, F is a vector of final demand, 
and the superscript “DOM” denotes a sub-sample focused on domestic 
linkages only.5 Export Intensity EI i
r measures the extent to which 
sector r of country i serve downstream sectors that are across a border, 
holding constant the length of the value chain for that country sector.
Export Intensity still embeds first order trade linkages in final or 
5 See Imbs and Pauwels (2020) for details.
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j for all s and j ≠ i. We 
introduce versions that abstract from final or intermediate direct trade, 
























The two measures capture the foreign exposure of sector r in country i 
abstracting from direct exports arising from the sector itself.
B. Unilateral Export Intensity
Export intensity captures the foreign exposure of sector r in country 
i vis à vis the rest of the world. To obtain unilateral measures, the only 
ones able to describe the characteristics of a country’s trade partners, 
we must specialize the measures to a unilateral context. To do so, we 
compute export intensity on the basis of the relevant matrices and 
vectors focused on a pair of countries ij.










, where r EIijU  is the typical element in 
(I − Aij)−2 Fij − (I − A  )−2 F  , and Urij  is the typical element in (I − Aij)−2 
Fij. All bilateral matrices are defined in Imbs and Pauwels (2020), and 
are straightforward specializations of the matrices A and F defined in 
the previous section. They simply focus on pairs of countries, e.g., Korea 
and all of its trade partners. By definition, EI rij captures the importance 
of country j as a foreign market for sector r in country i.
We introduce measures of unilateral export intensities that abstract 
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C. Conventional measures of trade
The most widespread measures of openness are based on direct 
trade.6 The value of exports (or imports) is often normalized by value 
added value converted in USD at PPP exchange rates, following Alcalá 






















where the numerator sums the USD value of total exports from sector r 
in country i in final goods with ∑ rj ijF  and in intermediate goods with 
≠∑ ∑
rs
j i s ijZ .
III. Korea’s Patterns of Trade
A. Korea’s Openness
The world input-output matrix W has typical element Zri sj . The World 
Input-Output Tables supplement input-output information with vectors 
of final demand F rij. Final demand breaks down into a domestic and 
an international component by country j, but not by sector s. After 
accounting for inventories and scaling W, we obtain A, with typical 
element ari
s
j . ADOM is the block diagonal of A that contains the within 
country components of the direct requirement matrix. And FDOM is 
defined by the domestic components of F. All matrices are measured 
using the 2016 release of the World Input-Output Tables, with data 
for 43 developed and developing countries from 2000 to 2014, or 
approximately 85 percent of world GDP.7
We first present aggregate numbers of Korea over time according to 
XFIN, EII, and EIF. We select three large, open economies including 
6 Inasmuch as TiVA isolates the value added component in direct gross 
exports it does build from direct trade measures, too.
7 See Imbs and Pauwels (2020) for details.
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China, Germany, Korea, along with Japan and the United States for 
comparison purposes. Figure 1 plots the very well known dynamics in 
XFIN, the ratio of exports in final goods relative to GDP between 2000 
and 2014. The plots are unsurprising: The US and Japan are relatively 
closed in the sense that small percentages of their GDP are exported. 
Then come China, Germany, and Korea, in that order. The time 
patterns are also well known: The early 2000s saw China become the 
most open economy in the world (according to XFIN), which it reached 
just before the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. China subsequently 





































































































































































































     
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    





















Note:  XFIN is depicted over time for five countries. Country values are total final 
good exports relative to GDP in USD at PPP exchange rate.
Figure 1
Exports of final Goods as a pErcEnt of Gdp
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levels as a percentage of GDP. All countries experienced a retrenchment 
after 2007, except for Korea, whose ratio of trade to GDP continued to 
rise to become the highest in the world as early as 2009. It continues to 
be ranked first, in spite of a fall in 2012-2013-2014.
How do these dynamics change when openness is measured instead 
using EII or EIF? Figures 2 and 3 begin to answer that question. 
First, openness as measured by export intensity is higher on average: 
While the most open countries export about 30 percent of their GDP 








































Note: The figure reports country-level averages of EII, using value added weights.
Figure 2
WEiGhtEd avEraGEs of Eii
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means that in the most open countries more than half of the average 
sector’s output (indirectly) serves customers outside of the national 
borders. The ranking between countries remains identical to Figure 1, 
with Korea and Germany the most open countries. Interestingly, Korea 
and Japan experience a much more marked upward trend over the 
period considered, and unlike Figure 1 do not retrench after 2010. The 
contrast between the two results suggest that (i) Germany and Korea 
have integrated massively in the global value chain since 2000, and 
(ii) the trend has accelerated since 2010, unlike in other prominent 
exporting countries like China. Integration in Korea has been on an 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The figure reports country-level averages of EIF, using value added weights
Figure 3
WEiGhtEd avEraGEs of Eif
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B. Open Sectors in Korea
We now illustrate the dispersion in openness across sectors, as 
implied by measures of direct trade vs. export intensity. We do this in 
the form of boxplots for each sector, representing the variation in each 
measure over time. Each boxplot contains mean, interquartile range, 
and extreme values. Figure 4 reports the sector distribution of XFIN, 
and Figure 5 that of XINT.
Figure 4 illustrates the fact that exports as a fraction of value 
added are very small for the vast majority of sectors except a handful. 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:  Boxplots of sector values of XFIN over time. Each plot reports means, 
interquartile ranges, and extrema.
Figure 4
xfin in south KorEa (ovEr 2000-2014)
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countries, and in particular in Korea, the most open country in the 
world as measured by the fraction of value added that is (directly) 
exported. Out of the 50 sectors reported in WIOT, only 5 export directly 
more than 50 percent of value added. They are the usual suspects, 
including most heavy manufacturing activities. Other activities like 
Other Manufacturing and Textiles display large volatility over time. But 
the vast majority of sectors are in fact “closed” in the sense that their 
direct exports are virtually zero, and they remain so over the full period. 
Of course, this includes all service sectors.
Figure 5 confirms the same skewness exists for direct exports in 
intermediate goods, as a fraction of value added. Average values of XINT 



















































































































































































































































































Note:  Boxplots of sector values of XINT over time. Each plot reports means, 
interquartile ranges, and extrema.
Figure 5
xint in south KorEa (ovEr 2000-2014)
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very little directly, and only the same five heavy manufacturing sectors 
export consistently more than 50 percent of their value added. Most 
sectors are “closed” when it comes to capturing how much of their value 
added is exported directly.
Figure 6 plots the same information for the same sectors, reporting 
the values of export intensity instead. The contrast is striking: The 
cross-sector distribution of openness is much less skewed with export 
intensity than it was with any measure of direct trade. Very few sectors 
are consistently “closed”, in the sense of very low values for export 
intensity. Construction is the only sector in Korea that displays a value 
for EII that is consistently below 10 percent. To reiterate, this means 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:  Boxplots of sector values of EII over time. Each plot reports means, 
interquartile ranges, and extrema.
Figure 6
Eii in south KorEa (ovEr 2000-2014)
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fact indirectly sold to foreign customers. Most services, like Wholesale 
Trade or business services have average values above 40 percent over 
the period. The ranking at the very top of the distribution is similar 
to what measures of direct trade imply: Heavy manufactures are the 
most open. But the difference between the top 5 or 10 sectors and the 
rest of them is much less marked. For example, Motors, Chemicals, 
or Computers have values of EII above 60 percent. But Marketing, 
Transportation, or Waste have values around 50 percent: The difference 
is minimal, much smaller than what was implied by Figures 4 and 
5. Korea continues to be a very open economy, but this comes from 
the fact that most of its sectors are open. This illustrates the large 
integration of the Korean economy in global supply chains: Korean 
services, for example, are very open by international standards, because 
their downstream customers are often located across the border.
C. Korea’s Trade Partners
This section introduces the unilateral versions of export intensity 
measures, with the purpose of describing the cross-section of Korea’s 
trade partners. As before, we compare the distribution of trade partners 
on the basis of export intensity with what conventional direct trade 
measures would imply.
Figure 7 ranks Korea’s trade partners according to XFINij, defined as 












The figure illustrates the well known rise of China as the main export 
market for Korea over the 2000s. The next trade partners in the list 
are also unsurprising: Japan is a far second after China, followed by 
Germany, Australia, and a group of Western European rich countries.
Figure 8 now ranks Korea’s trade partners according to EII ij, defined 
as gross output weighted averages of EII rij. The country ranking is 
similar at the top, with China once again the overwhelmingly dominant 
trade partner of Korea. But the next countries in the list are actually 
quite different: Taiwan and Japan come second, followed by Russia, 
Norway, and Germany. This illustrates the predominance of vertical, 
indirect trade between Korea and Taiwan in particular, and also with 
energy-exporting Russia and Norway. It is also notable that EII takes 
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larger values for more countries than direct trade: Figure 7 suggests 
that Korea has basically three main partners. Figure 8 suggests there 
are perhaps seven or eight countries that have tight links with Korea, 
once indirect trade is allowed. Korea is much more integrated in the 
world economy than what is suggested by its direct exports, a reflection 
of its integration in global value chains.
Figures 7 and 8 do not give information on time changes in the 
distribution of Korea’s trade partners. In Figures 9 and 10 we select 
the top seven trade partners as implied by EIIij, and track the values 
of XFINij and EIIij since 2000. Both figures illustrate the rise of China 
as Korea’s main trade partner. What is interesting is the reversal in 































































Note:  Boxplots of aggregate values of XFINij across j. Each plot reports means, 
interquartile ranges, and extreme values over time.
Figure 7
KorEa’s tradE partnErs on thE basis of XFIN (2000-2014)
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words, China’s predominance in Korea’s trade started receding from 
2011 according to direct trade, but not according to export intensity: 
Figure 10 shows an uninterrupted upward trend from 2000 to 2014. 
Both figures also illustrate the vast predominance of China for Korea’s 
trade, far above Japan. In direct trade, this predominance started rising 
in earnest from 2007, perhaps as direct exports from Korea to China 
intensified after the Great Financial Crisis. At the time, China started 
retrenching on its domestic market, and therefore imported more. But 
in indirect trade, it prevails throughout the period. In other word, while 
direct trade between Korea and China fluctuates, indirect trade is 
unambiguously on the rise over the period.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note:  Boxplots of aggregate values of EIIij across j. Each plot reports means, 
interquartile ranges, and extreme values over time.
Figure 8
KorEa’s tradE partnErs on thE basis of EII (2000-2014)
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Even though levels are substantially smaller than for China and Japan, 
Korean indirect trade with Taiwan displays a marked upward trend. 
In contrast, direct exports to Taiwan are negligible according to XFIN, 
and they remain so throughout the period. These figures show that 
the ranking and the evolution of Korea’s trade partners both depend 
crucially on allowances for indirect trade. On the basis of export 
intensity, China and Taiwan have been increasingly important for Korea 
since 2000. Not on the basis of conventional measures of direct trade.
We now focus on Korea’s three large trade partners, and combine the 
unilateral approach with a sectoral breakdown. We report the sector-





























Note: XFIN over time for Korea’s main trade partners.
Figure 9
XFIN ovEr timE, by tradE partnEr
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(XFIN rij for all r) for j = China, Japan, and Germany. The corresponding 
results are reported in Figures 11, 12, and 13. The comparison between 
the three figures shows the striking extent of bilateral integration 
between Korea and China, for two reasons. First, EII is systematically 
much higher for most sectors between Korea and China. All sectors but 
perhaps the five least open have average values of EII rij above 30 percent 
when j = China, and these values have increased drastically over the 
period. This is dramatically different from what direct export measures 
imply, i.e., that only a few manufacturing sectors trade with China. 
Figure 11 illustrates how the Korean economy is deeply intertwined 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: EII over time for Korea’s main trade partners.
Figure 10
EII ovEr timE, by tradE partnEr
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Second, Figure 12 and 13, focused on Japan and Germany, present 
sector-level breakdowns that are drastically different from Figure 11. 
In particular, export intensity is unanimously lower, across all sectors, 
between Korea and Japan (or Germany) than they are with China. 
This is focusing on indirect trade: Even with Japan, there are only six 
(heavy manufacturing) sectors for which EII rij exceeds 20 percent. And 
with Germany, all sectors are below 10 percent. The Korean economy 
is deeply integrated with China, across virtually all of its sectors. This 
integration exceeds by far that with Korea’s second trade partner, 
Japan. And it has been deepening uninterruptedly since 2000. As the 
right panels of Figures 11, 12, and 13 show, these facts are simply not 
apparent when using conventional measures of integration, based on 
direct trade.
IV. Conclusion
We apply to Korea the measure of openness based on high order 
trade, labeled Export Intensity (EI), introduced in Imbs and Pauwels 
(2020). We examine Korea’s patterns of trade when measured by EI, 
vs. when it is measured by more conventional direct trade. We show 
that Korea’s openness has increased uninterruptedly since 2000 
when measured with EI, but not when measured by direct trade. This 
increase is disproportionately caused by China, whose direct imports 
from Korea have fallen since 2011, but whose indirect imports have 
risen monotonously since 2000. The extent of Korea’s integration with 
China is vastly greater than with Korea’s second trade partner, Japan: 
It covers most sectors in Korea’s economy, including services. At sector 
level, export intensity takes values two to three times greater between 
Korea and China than between Korea and Japan or Germany. This is 
not surprising given the size and proximity of the Chinese economy. But 
it would not be detectable using standard measures of openness, based 
on direct trade.
(Received 20 May 2020; Accepted 26 June 2020)
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